Winter / Hiver 2017 11 the plans to focus on capturing and mining resources from asteroids. While this may be feasible in a blockbuster movie, it is not real- istic following the physics principles of orbit- al dynamics. As discussed in the next issue, smaller incremental steps starting from in situ resource utilization (ISRU) are more realistic first steps. Hence the reason for the recently approved US and Luxemburg laws related to space mining explicitly stating that they are not claiming ownership of any celes- tial body, but rather only using the resources. When one thinks about these contemporary national space laws in the context of the treaty, it is appropriate to remember that “law is not created in a vacuum, not even space law” . This is the essence of Article III that situates the OST within broader international laws; bringing to it broader principles from other treaties, and also defining the scope and overlaps with specialized laws affecting space activities like frequency regulations through the International Telecommunica- tion Union. On June 20, 1967, the Hon. Paul Hellyer, Minister of National Defence, spoke to Par- liament about Canada’s intention to ratify the OST. Like many politicians in office at the time, he brushed through most of the treaty and dwelled on the importance of Article IV banning the use of weapons of mass destruc- tion in space . Prime Minister Diefenbaker (then Leader of the Opposition) took this a step further in his remarks referring to the OST as a “treaty for the control of armaments in outer space,” thus neglecting all the other articles. However, these comments did not come as a surprise, as earlier in his career he had instituted measures in the event that Canada was attacked by intercontinental bal- listic missiles and even built a secret bunker outside of Ottawa (now known as the Dief- enbunker Museum) to ensure continuity of government in the event of an attack. Going back to the treaty, there are two im- portant elements carefully worded in Arti- cle IV. First, the text does not demilitarize space, but rather removes the use of certain types of weapons. That was needed be- cause both superpowers wanted to continue using space for reconnaissance and remote sensing to support their military activities. Second, like Johnson says, “this article con- cerns weapons of ‘mass destruction’ and it may therefore tacitly permit other types of weapons” . Since it does not define what is allowed, Wong and Fergusson argue that anything can be considered a weapon, as about territorial claims like those found in the Antarctic Treaty. Hence, it is no wonder why Neil Armstrong’s poetic words while descending from the Lunar Module did not focus on an American accomplishment, but rather on “one giant leap for mankind.” In recent years, Article II appeared in the mainstream media for both commercial schemes and legitimate business ventures. A few crafty online entrepreneurs began selling plots of land on the Moon claiming that the OST only applies to states and does inhibit private individuals or corporations from en- gaging in these activities. It is not worth devoting much time to these scams other than to say they are not supported by the legal community who insists Article II must be read in the context of the full treaty. This includes Article VI, that entrusts all actions performed by individuals or corporations to their respective states. In addition, the national appropriation topic has also been discussed in the context of resource extrac- tion. In many cases, the media extrapolates outer space for the benefit of all humankind. Furthermore, it maintains the notion of ‘principles’ from its earlier document rec- ognizing, as Christopher Johnson, the Space Law Advisor at the Secure World Founda- tion, describes this “is not a comprehensive nor exhaustive set of exacting rules” . As a binding continuation to the preamble, Article I designates the exploration and use of space as the province of all humankind and states that the use of outer space “shall be carried out for the benefit and in the in- terests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific develop- ment.” When read in isolation, the article raised concerns that some countries without the ability to develop their own space assets would be getting a free ride. However, the intent is not to force nations to develop mis- sions that have economic and humanitarian benefits for the entire world. Rather, as ex- plained by Goldberg to the US Senate, this article emphasizes that “space shall be free for exploration and use by all states without discrimination of any kind” . Article II prohibits any type of national appro- priation, thus assuring to the Space Race adver- saries that second place would not need a foreign visa to land on the Moon. By pre-emptively adding a clause before anyone landed on another celestial body, the UN’s COPUOS avoided convolut- ing the text to acknowledge disputes The first five statements contain words like ‘inspired,’ ‘believing,’ and ‘desiring’ to encompass the dreams of peaceful and collaborative uses of outer space for the benefit of all humankind.